Focus groups as ethnography: the case of Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff by Rhodes, R.A.W. & Tiernan, Anne
1 Focus groups and prime ministers’ chiefs of staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOCUS GROUPS AND PRIME MINISTERS’ CHIEFS OF 
STAFF 
 
 
 
R.A.W. Rhodes and Anne Tiernan 
 
Contact addresses: 
R. A. W. Rhodes 
Faculty of Social and Human Sciences 
University of Southampton 
Murray Building 
Southampton 
SO171BJ 
United Kingdom 
 
Email: r.a.w.rhodes@soton.ac.uk; or r.rhodes@griffith.edu.au 
 
and 
 
Anne Tiernan 
School of Government and International Relations 
Griffith University 
 
Email: a.tiernan@griffith.edu.au 
 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. and Anne Tiernan ‘Focus groups as ethnography: the case of Prime 
Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff’ Journal of Organizational Ethnography 3 (3) 2015. Accepted 11 
February 2015.  
2 Focus groups and prime ministers’ chiefs of staff 
 
 
Introduction 
In the USA, the job of the President’s Chief of Staff (from now on CoS) is characterised 
as ‘javelin catcher’. In Australia, they have been called ‘pest controllers’ and ‘shock absorbers’. 
All are vivid metaphors for a job that is carried out far from the public eye in the shadows of 
politics. These men and women are the hub of a court or network that supports prime 
ministers (Rhodes 2013). They are the pivotal point at which the political and the 
administrative meet. It is a private web. Apart from the occasional interview or public lecture 
little is known about them or their work. So, how do we find out what they and how they do it? 
This paper discusses the contribution of focus groups to accessing the innermost 
reaches of government. It seeks to identify the advantages and disadvantages of using focus 
groups in political and administrative ethnography. It illustrates the discussion with the case of 
focus group research conducted with a cohort of 11 individuals who held the position of Chief 
of Staff (CoS) to the Prime Minister of Australia. Our project examined the work of CoS who 
served prime ministers from Malcolm Fraser to Kevin Rudd. We collected their stories - the 
institutional memory - of a previously unexamined part of the system of advice and support to 
Australian political leaders. Those readers interested in Australian government - the ‘geek’ 
element as one reviewer put it – should seek out Rhodes and Tiernan (2014a and 2014b). 
Here, we focus on the usefulness of focus groups in elite ethnography.  
This paper outlines the current state of political and administrative ethnography in 
political science and public administration before suggesting that focus groups are a useful tool 
in the study of governing elites. Briefly we describe the job of prime ministers’ CoS before 
explaining our research design, the preparations for the focus group sessions, and the strategies 
used to manage the dynamics of a diverse group that included former political enemies and 
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factional rivals. We outline our approach to analysis and interpretation before reviewing the 
strengths and weaknesses of focus groups for research into political and administrative elites. 
To be clear, we do not report our findings (see Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a); or discuss our 
theory (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003 and 2006). We offer a commentary on one (not all) of our 
methods; that is, on focus groups.  
Political and administrative ethnography 
Ethnography was traditionally the province of cultural anthropologists, but it has 
significant potential for political scientists (see Rhodes 2015). Although as Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007: 2) note, it ‘does not have a standard, well-defined meaning’, some words and 
phrases recur. The ethnographer studies people’s everyday lives. The aim is to recover the 
meaning of their actions. By long association, meaning is captured by participant observation; 
the defining method of ethnography. Participant observation typically involves fieldwork or 
deep immersion, whether looking at a Congressional district, a government department or a 
tribe in Africa.  
Until recently, there was little political ethnography by political scientists. For example, 
Auyer and Joseph’s (2007: 2) review of 1,000 articles published in the American Journal of 
Political Science and the American Political Science Review between 1996 and 2005 found that 
‘only one article relies on ethnography as a data-production technique’. If it is possible, there is 
even less administrative ethnography. As Auyero and Joseph (2007: 2) conclude there is a 
‘double absence’. There is little public administration in the ethnographic literature and even 
less ethnography in the study of public administration.1 
Nowadays, however, ethnography is no longer defined by participant observation. It has 
become a diverse and disparate set of practices. Ethnographers deploy a broad toolkit of 
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research methods, analogous to quilt making, montage, or bricolage – ‘a pieced together set of 
representations that are fitted to the specifics of a complex situation’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 
4). The classic intensive fieldwork study is supplemented by hit-and-run ethnography. So, we 
‘study-up’, and ‘follow through’ by conducting ‘yo-yo-research’ in ‘contact zones’ and multi-
local sites. These several shorthand expressions can be explained easily. ‘Studying-up’ refers 
to the study of elites not police officers, social workers, and teachers. ‘Studying through’ 
refers to following events such as making a policy through the ‘webs and relations between 
actors, institutions and discourses across time and space’ (Shore and Wright 1997: 14). ‘Yo-
Yo research’ refers to both regular movement in and out of the field and to participant 
observation in many local sites (Wulff 2002). A ‘contact zone’ is the “space”, such as a 
museum, in which peoples geographically and historically separated meet one another and 
establish continuing relations, usually characterised by inequality and conflict (Clifford 1997: 
6-7). Focus groups are one more addition to this toolkit. 
Focus groups are not commonly used in ethnography but they have a particular 
advantage when studying elites. Elite ethnography is difficult and poses many challenges. We 
are attempting to enter a closed and secretive world, a hidden world, occupied by people who 
are more powerful than the researcher. Observing governing elites at work is our preferred 
research tool but we know from bitter experience that our requests for such access can be 
denied. Focus groups are another way of gaining access to a group of elite actors, to observe 
them in action when observation is not possible at the workplace, especially when the relevant 
individuals are no longer in office, as in this case. So, focus groups are another way of ‘being 
there’ and side-stepping the problems of access and secrecy. 
That said, it should be obvious they are not always useful. We are describing their use 
in the specific setting of governing elites. We are not claiming they are a stand-alone method. 
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So, ideally, we would supplement a focus group with shadowing a CoS. As we will describe 
below, we do supplement the focus group by including ethnographic interviewing in our battery 
of tools for collecting data. Moreover, the data generated by focus groups requires an 
ethnographic sensibility for interpreting the conversations. Ethnography is about recovering 
meaning and locating that meaning in its broader context; in this case, governmental traditions. 
So, focus groups are an ethnographic tool because ethnography is now a diverse set of practices 
linked not by a shared method - participant observation - but by a shared focus on the recovery 
of meaning.  
Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff  
CoS have long been recognised as key players in the Australian core executive. They are 
appointed by the prime minister because they are known to be loyal and committed. They 
have a broad remit, but there is no job description. They support both the person who is prime 
minister and the position that they hold. They run the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) of over 
50 staff that operates twenty-four hours a day every day of the year. The CoS tries to ensure the 
prime minister sets priorities and sticks to them, despite the inevitable crises demanding their 
time and attention. They help the prime minister to control the agenda, to coordinate policy 
initiatives, and to keep effective relationships with the cabinet, the ministry, the party room, the 
media and the public service. They filter who the prime minister sees and how and where they 
spend their time. Over its forty-year history, the position of CoS to the prime minister has 
evolved from an administrative position to one that is now mainly political. 
The position of CoS to the Australian prime minister may be a nodal role in core 
executive networks but little is known about the nature of the job. How have its occupants 
adjusted to the personalities, preferences and working styles of the prime ministers they have 
supported? How have they navigated the complexities and pressures of life at the centre of 
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government? How have they dealt with the challenges confronted at different stages of their 
service?  
Our project focused on the beliefs and practices of those who have held the job of CoS, 
the practices they describe and the stories that they tell about supporting prime ministers. Our 
shared goal (theirs and ours) was to build the institutional memory of the PMO. We proceeded 
from the shared premise that what they learned about political leadership and governing might 
help future CoS. Given the gap between what is written and their first-hand knowledge of life in 
prime ministers’ offices, our study provided an opportunity for CoS to record in their own 
words what it was like to ‘be there’. The focus groups enabled us to collect their individual and 
collective stories about the CoS job. 
Focus groups as a tool of ethnographic research 
Focus groups are well established in advertising and marketing research and have been 
successfully adapted to the social sciences (Agar and Macdonald 1995, Bloor et al. 2001). They 
involve getting a group of people together to discuss their beliefs and practices. The groups are 
interactive and group members are encouraged by a moderator to talk to one another. The 
research does not interview the group members but facilitates their discussion. For Morgan 
(1997: 2), the ‘hallmark’ of focus groups is ‘the explicit use of group interaction to produce data 
and insights’. However, there are no guarantees that a group assembled by researchers will 
promote participation and discussion on a ‘defined area of interest in a permissive, 
nonthreatening environment’ (Krueger 2008: 18). So, it is important to prepare carefully for, 
structure, and manage focus group interactions (Morgan 1998; Krueger 1998). How did we 
prepare for and structure our study of prime ministers’ CoS? 
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Research design 
Our study of prime ministers’ CoS used methods drawn from the broad toolkit of 
interpretive political science. Clearly there are many ways of investigating how CoS do their job 
and how and why it changes. In our previous research, our preferred methods have been elite 
interviews with senior politicians and public servants, and participant observation. From this 
project’s inception we proposed to hold focus groups with people who had served as CoS. It 
was a central, but not our only, research and data collection strategy.  
The research design for our focus groups was adapted from previous studies of Chiefs of 
Staff in the United States. This research has employed many methods, including elite 
interviews and focus group discussions (see, for example, Kernell and Popkin 1986; Kumar 
and Sullivan 2003; Sullivan 2004). Practitioners and scholars have collaborated to build the 
institutional memory of the White House staff, including the position of CoS. Sharing of 
insights between those who have worked closely with presidents on both sides of American 
politics was seen as a way of making the structures of advice and support more professional, 
and building policy capacity. It was a way of cutting through the opacity and confidentiality that 
necessarily surrounds a current incumbent. It was a means of building the institutional memory 
of the presidency and of helping an incoming President to ‘hit the ground running’ (Sullivan 
2004).  
Our Australian study had similar ambitions. It aimed to develop a nuanced 
understanding of the post of CoS from the perspective of those who had held it. Our proposal 
was funded by ANZSOG, a consortium of Australian and New Zealand governments and 
universities. It was established under the Howard government and enjoys strong bipartisan 
support. Key Coalition figures, including David Kemp (CoS to Malcolm Fraser) and Arthur 
Sinodinos (CoS to John Howard) and senior officials from all levels of government were 
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involved in its establishment, and served on the ANZSOG board. We mention these facts 
because the support of such a trusted, independent body lent credibility to our research and 
facilitated access to the CoS. Access is always an issue when doing research involving governing 
elites. The reputation of the researcher is one factor. The standing of the sponsor is another. 
We are known to many respondents as ‘a safe pair of hands’ and ANZSOG is a respected 
training organization for government. So, we had the essential prerequisites of access and trust.  
In late 2009, eleven former prime ministerial CoS spanning governments from Fraser 
to Rudd came together to take part in two closed, round-table focus group discussions. We 
called them workshops because focus groups are associated with political campaigning and 
market research. We wanted to avoid such connotations. With their emphasis on group 
interaction, our workshops were focus groups in all but name.  
Each session aimed to elicit participants’ views on the following topics: 
• the development and evolution of the job of CoS 
• how different individuals approached the task of working with the Prime Minister 
• the key duties and responsibilities that they performed 
• the challenges confronting the CoS at different stages of the governing cycle 
• lessons that might be passed on to their successors. 
In government, it is widely accepted that the first, modern CoS was appointed in 1972. 
Between then and June 2013, when our study ends, twenty-four individuals held the CoS 
position (see Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a). Seven attended the first focus group in Canberra on 
1 September 2009. A second focus group, held in Sydney on 11 December 2009, was attended 
by four former CoS. Associate Professor Anne Tiernan and Professor Patrick Weller, AO, 
from the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University facilitated the two 
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focus groups. The participants agreed that we could record, transcribe and quote from 
proceedings. We did not consider it appropriate to ask the serving CoS to attend the focus 
group. The sessions that formed the basis for our research were conducted in late 2009.  
Since 2009, three individuals have been the Prime Minister’s CoS, all for relatively brief 
periods. To cover these developments, we conducted a further round of interviews with these 
CoS, and other key respondents; 15 in total. We supplemented the interviews with 
documentary and other primary sources, and informal conversations. The follow-up interviews 
were conducted by Rod Rhodes and Anne Tiernan. 
Preparing for the focus group sessions 
The interviews with ministers for Tiernan and Weller (2010) gave us access to senior 
figures from the outgoing Howard and incoming Rudd governments. For the past forty years, 
Weller has conducted research on ministers, prime ministers and Cabinet. He has established 
trusting relationships with key members of the Fraser, and Hawke courts, including Dale Budd 
and David Kemp. Tiernan’s (2007) research on ministerial staffers established equivalent 
relationships with the Hawke, Keating and Howard courts. We had a database of ministerial 
appointment, background and career data covering the Fraser to Rudd governments. We had a 
repository of more than 100 interviews with core executive actors that also included the 
fieldwork by Tiernan (2007) and Tiernan and Weller (2010) on ministerial staffers and 
ministers respectively. These contacts not only enabled us to conduct further interviews but it 
also meant we held informal conversations with current and former ministers and ministerial 
staffers, including former prime ministers’ CoS.  
For the focus groups, we obtained the current contact details of the CoS using public 
information and snowball sampling techniques. Where necessary, we used our existing 
networks to find and contact people. We would approach a CoS through people they knew 
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and trusted. Such networking and snowballing are essential for political scientists attempting to 
study governing elites. 
We wrote formally to key individuals, to invite their participation. Our letter explained 
that our research approach had been successfully used twice in the United States (see Kernell 
and Popkin 1986, Sullivan 2004). We developed a background paper that provided a summary 
of the US research and outlined our aims for this Australian project. We were lucky and our 
timing was good. Key CoS who later returned to public life, at the time, were doing other 
things.2 Former CoS were persuaded our study had merit (Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a: 10). 
Several accepted immediately our invitation to participate. Others took more prompting, but 
agreed after being provided more detail and having any questions they had answered.  
We took the decision to conduct two focus groups after several weeks of trying 
unsuccessfully to coordinate the diaries of busy senior figures spread across four Australian 
capitals, including in one case, Perth. At first, we thought this was less than ideal because the 
number of participants was seven in Canberra and only four in Sydney. We were concerned 
the dynamics of so small a group might inhibit discussion or limit the range of topics canvassed. 
It was not a problem – in Australian parlance, ‘no worries’ – but we discuss group dynamics in 
more detail below.  
The Canberra focus group was an evening meeting. Discussions were conducted in two 
sessions, each of around two hour’s duration. We had a break of about 45 minutes for drinks 
and refreshments while the boardroom was set for a working dinner. Sydney was a morning 
meeting, commencing with discussions over breakfast and running through until lunch-time. 
Each focus group lasted roughly four hours. A photographer took pictures of the group and 
individuals simply to illustrate the planned book. It was our judgement that videotaping the 
proceedings would be a step too far. We settled for recording and transcribing the sessions – an 
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approach that Bloor et al. (2001: 3) consider the most rigorous analytical strategy for focus 
group research.  
Managing group dynamics  
Morgan (1997: 15) argues that focus groups’ reliance on interaction in the group to 
produce data is a key strength. He notes participants’ comments on each other’s experiences 
and opinions are ‘a valuable source of insights into complex behaviours and motivations’. But 
much depends on the design and management of focus groups. They are a method for 
gathering research data and are created for a well-defined purpose (Morgan 1998). With this in 
mind, we tweaked the focus group methodology by developing procedures we judged were 
suited to working with members of the governing elite. A week before the workshop session, 
we circulated a list of research questions to guide discussion (see Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a). 
We asked each CoS to open discussion on a specific question that was assigned in advance. 
We proceeded broadly in chronological order of service. These procedures are not the norm 
in focus groups but worked well, especially as these elite respondents are used to driving their 
own agendas. The moderator’s key tasks were to ensure that all topics were covered and that 
the discussion remained focused.  
A focus group is a constructed social situation, where the informants share information 
about their practices with other participants. On this occasion, the participants did not hold 
different positions in the organization. None were currently a CoS. None were still in 
government. The members were alike; there were no differences of rank, no opportunity to 
exert authority one over the other and little point in playing power games beyond gratifying 
their own egos. If anyone’s ego required such a massage, it was not obvious to us or to the 
other participants who would have briskly put an end to any such behaviour. Nor were there 
any obvious attempts to be liked by or to please the moderators.  
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We explained that the study would be conducted following the University’s research 
ethics protocols. Coupled with their prior experiences of talking to us, they were confident that 
no ill-judged remark would return to haunt them later. We agreed quotations would be cited 
and attributed only with their express permission. It is our judgement the CoS came to the 
workshops as a group of like-minded colleagues willing and able to share their experiences 
openly. Our aim was not to find disagreements, but to identify common ground from which to 
draw lessons.  
We had been concerned the dynamic among a diverse group of former political 
enemies, factional and professional rivals might inhibit discussion of sensitive issues. However, 
the everyday demands of the job meant they had much in common. Any lingering tensions or 
partisan differences quickly dissipated. Of course, possibly, disagreements and power plays 
could have elicited more ‘accurate’ and interesting information. Such behaviour could also 
have disrupted the group and ended cooperation and sharing. 
We encountered two issues in managing the focus groups. First, we discovered after the 
meetings that two separate focus groups cemented the participation of one of the CoS who was 
not keen on being in a session with a former colleague. The second issue manifested as a 
power play with us. Before discussion started, one participant contested our account of how the 
CoS’ job had developed in our Background Paper. He questioned our decision to commence 
the study with the Whitlam government, arguing there was an extensive prehistory under earlier 
governments. He wanted assurance that we would address the period before 1972 and give due 
attention to the Menzies and later Coalition governments (see Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a: 
chapter 3). This exchange can be read as a partisan point, but we see it more as a test; a clear if 
mild reminder of the power relativities between ourselves as researchers and the CoS. How we 
responded was the critical issue. We explained our rationale for taking 1972 as our starting 
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point, and agreed to take account of his concerns and any other comments and suggestions 
from participants. Seemingly appeased, and with the first CoS ready to open debate, the focus 
group proper began. After this early awkwardness, we had ‘no worries’ because they settled into 
a free and frank exchange of views. At times, we were conscious that we were not in control of 
the group. Some mild degree of anarchy is to be expected in any group indulging in open-
ended discussion. Their freewheeling conversations demonstrated they were at ease; a 
gratifying outcome.  
Our opening question was: ‘What is the job of the Chief of Staff? What are its duties and 
responsibilities?’ CoS responses to this question illustrate the value of focus groups for 
ethnographic research in political science. As invited, David Kemp, widely credited with 
helping Malcolm Fraser develop the framework for a significantly upgraded Prime Minister’s 
private office, outlined how Fraser’s view of the CoS position evolved during his time in office. 
Kemp described the key developments and events that led to a broadening of the CoS’ tasks. 
Dale Budd confirmed and elaborated this account. He compared the different ways each 
approached the job of meeting their prime minister’s needs. Graham Evans (Hawke) and Don 
Russell (Keating) commented on the long-term impact of Fraser’s vision and views had on the 
CoS position. Such interaction produced a far richer account of how the PMO and the CoS 
developed than would have been possible through semi-structured interviews with individual 
CoS.  
Other questions were organised chronologically. Participants explored challenges 
confronting the CoS at key stages of the governing cycle. Thus, the group discussed issues of 
transition, learning to govern, crises and unexpected events, facing re-election, renewing the 
mandate, and facing defeat. All yielded valuable insights and, at times, amusing exchanges. 
There was much laughter as individual’s stories bumped into one another. For example, David 
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Epstein (CoS to Rudd) thought his predecessor, Nicole Freely (CoS to Howard), deliberately 
ignored the public service, when she was simply unaware that they would (say) deal with the 
voluminous correspondence for her. It was that simple. Human frailty is as powerful an 
explanation of what was going on as political calculation.  
Ethnography is a ‘rather uneasy combination of involvement and detachment’  (Fox 
2004: 4). Because we are detached, we are ‘strangers’, not members of the group, so, in seeking 
to understand their world, we expect to be unaware of several issues. They emerged 
spontaneously from the CoS’ reflections. For example, we learned about the importance of 
‘feeding and watering’ prime ministers and protecting their health by carefully monitoring the 
safety of food, particularly when they travel overseas. As the following exchange shows, the 
Canberra focus group developed a vivid word portrait of Dr. Graham Killer, Surgeon General 
for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, who has been personal physician to prime ministers 
since 1991. Here, as elsewhere, the lack of space means that we illustrate a general point of 
agreement in the group with a story from one or two individuals. 
Geoff Walsh: Paul [Keating] wasn’t too fussy [about eating], except when we went 
[on an overseas visit]. We had a doctor who travelled with us—the improbably 
named Dr. Killer. 
Grahame Morris: He is still the man. 
Geoff Walsh: He hasn’t lost a Prime Minister yet [laughs]. Anyway, Dr. Killer went 
to inspect the kitchen before the state dinner … He came back ashen-faced and 
said, ‘There’s a toilet in the middle of the kitchen. My advice is don’t eat anything.’ 
So Paul spent the night with the menu in front of him and basically dodging, 
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because he had a view that you could pick up hepatitis or something. That would 
be the end of your career. 
Grahame Morris: It’s still the standard advice of Graham Killer now: anything that 
might have been near water, lettuce or anything, don’t eat it. Brush your teeth out 
of bottled water or whiskey. So, he’s still giving the same advice and he’s still 
keeping PMs alive. 
Sydney focus group participants added their experiences after we recounted our concern 
that ‘Dr. Killer’ might have been a nickname and sought to clarify his status: 
David Epstein: Dr. Killer and his mystery bag of drugs. 
Allan Hawke: He’s been the one constant [in the PMO] throughout all of this. Been 
there forever. You should interview him I reckon.  
Nicole Feely: You really need it don’t you? A great big bag.  
This exchange is significant for two reasons. First, in this degree of detail, academics 
know so little about government. The CoS take such practices for granted and the researchers 
don’t know what they don’t know, so cannot ask relevant questions. Group discussion takes 
you down illuminating byways that would never occur in individual interviews. It is a clear 
illustration of why focus groups are more revealing than individual interviews (Bloor et al. 
2001). Second, the story illustrates the lengths to which the CoS will go to protect their prime 
minister. There is no partisan dimension to their practices here, just a shared concern for the 
prime minister’s well-being.  
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There were many such exchanges. Among the most revealing for our project was the 
participants’ insistence that a broad connotation of political is essential to understanding the 
support needs of present-day prime ministers: 
David Kemp: I think it’s also important to read the word ‘political’ as having broad 
meanings. There’s a tendency to think political equals elections, equals 
campaigning, equals voting. But that’s not right. Political involves managing the 
legislation in the Senate and the sensitivities of the minor parties, political and 
what’s Senator [Harradine] going to do? 3 Political means how is the backbench 
going to feel about this? Are they going to support this course of policy? Political 
means, what are you picking up about how this policy is working? Or political 
could mean are our priorities right at the moment or do we need to shift them in 
some way? 
Political can mean what are the consequences of this political event and how 
do you read that? So there’s a lot of political expertise there, which has to do with 
effective government, I would say. I think that without the political being dominant, 
you don’t get effective government. 
Now that doesn’t mean that one political aspect, one aspect of being 
political—campaigning—needs to dominate everything. I think that would be bad. 
But being politically effective means managing the government properly because all 
these issues of leadership and values and the different groups that have to be 
coordinated, that’s all political. They are things that were not properly done in my 
view before 1975 or 1972, whatever point you’d like to take. 
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Graham Evans: I agree with the points that David [Kemp] has made. There’s a significant 
difference between a view of political which is a narrow one, which I would say is party 
political, and a broader view that relates to implementation of policy. Advising on the 
context and consequence of policy is central to the role of prime ministerial offices, so 
the Prime Minister’s policies have the best chance of being agreed to and implemented. 
We use one long quote from a single individual but his comments were accompanied by 
much group nodding. His views were widely shared. Indeed there wasn’t a single voice of 
dissent, just elaboration and illustrations of the points made.  
Analysis and interpretation 
The two focus groups yielded nearly nine hours of qualitative data; 230 pages of 
transcripts in total. We checked the transcripts against the audio and where necessary, made 
corrections. Such a valuable data set warrants a careful curator. We read the transcripts 
separately with an agreed codebook modified from our earlier work on governing elites (see 
Rhodes 2011; Tiernan and Weller 2010). We compared our results, but disagreed more over 
the severity with which we edited the transcripts for inclusion in the books than about issues of 
substance. Our dilemma was how best to organise the rich insights and institutional memory 
generated by the CoS’ individual and collective contributions4  
We took the organising concepts for telling their stories from Bevir and Rhodes’ (2003 
and 2006). Their interpretive approach shifts analysis away from institutions, functions and roles 
of mainstream public administration to the actions and practices of interdependent actors. To 
understand actions and practices, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, the beliefs and 
preferences of the people involved.. An interpretive approach seeks to understand the webs of 
significance that people spin for themselves. It provides a ‘thick description’ in which the 
researcher writes his or her construction of the subject’s constructions of what the subject is up 
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to (adapted from Geertz 1993: 9). So, the task is both to unpack the disparate and contingent 
beliefs and practices of individuals through which they construct their world; then to identify the 
recurrent patterns of actions and related beliefs; the shared beliefs. So, in interpreting our focus 
group data, we focused on the shared beliefs and practices of the CoS.  
The case for focus groups 
Commenting on our draft manuscript, a colleague remarked: ‘I think people tell you a 
lot more in interviews than probably they tell you in the focus group setting’.  We do not agree 
that focus groups are inferior to semi-structured interviews as a method for data collection. Of 
course, interviews can be revealing in the hands of a skilled interviewer. Although we are 
experienced interviewers, we have good and bad interviews. All elite interviewers know the 
public servant and minister who can negotiate such an encounter with ease. They can ‘talk for 
an hour without saying anything too interesting’ (Rawnsley 2001: xvii-xviii citing an interview 
with Robin Cooke, former British Foreign Secretary). Some days the elite interview resembles 
nothing more than a confining ritual. Moreover, interviews never last a day.  
A good focus group is revealing because the ‘focus’ is on interaction and conversation, 
not the single interviewee. The interaction between people clarifies the meaning of practices 
and events. Morgan (1997) highlights the potential for insights from focus groups, especially 
when part of a multi-method study (also see Bloor et al. 2001). And our study used several 
methods: in-depth interviewing, official documents, biographies, memoirs and diaries, informal 
conversations, as well as focus groups. So, we could cross-check data from multiple sources.  
Agar and MacDonald (1995: 78) suggest that ethnography provides ‘broader frames of 
interpretation’ for focus group data (Agar and MacDonald 1995: 85). Our interpretive theory 
provides the conceptual tools for evaluating the significance of focus group data. However, 
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Agar and MacDonald (1995) stress that the researcher must have prior knowledge of the 
‘shared folk models’ of focus group participants to assess discussions and interpret their 
meaning. Our combination of skills and experience is worth noting here. We both have 
extensive experience of research on governing elites in Australia and Britain. We are familiar 
with the folk theories of government in both countries. So, we have the requisite broader frame 
of interpretation to identify and evaluate the issues and themes in the conversation. That frame 
is the Australian Westminster tradition about executive government.  
All CoS share the beliefs and practices of the Westminster tradition about collective 
cabinet government, ministerial responsibility, a constitutional bureaucracy, and parliamentary 
sovereignty (Rhodes 2005; Rhodes et al. 2009). They had a shared narrative about what they 
were doing, what prime ministers needed, and how they worked. The focus groups revealed 
the common ground between them. For example, Grahame Morris explained that ‘[Howard] 
used to place great importance on the party room meeting, on the Cabinet, on the leadership 
meetings and on the tactics meeting. So you sort of had three big touch points most days, or 
certainly most weeks with the colleagues.’ The CoS agreed that their prime ministers had to 
manage their dependence on their ministerial colleagues, cabinet and the party in parliament; 
all cornerstones of the Australian governmental tradition.  
Focus groups have some singular advantages when studying closed elite groups. First, 
group discussion provides more illuminating insights because participants open up more topics 
than would occur in an individual interviewee.  
Second, the interaction between people clarifies the meaning of practices. Focus groups 
provide opportunities to develop a detailed understanding of participants’ beliefs and actions, 
and to compare experiences and to encompass a diversity of views.  
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Third, like other forms of ethnography, focus groups make tacit knowledge explicit. 
They produce context-specific qualitative data on complex and sensitive issues. For example, 
supporting the prime minister did not refer simply to the official role but also to the person; to 
family, health, and eating overseas.  
Fourth, focus groups can produce ‘relevant’ knowledge and our work was seen as 
relevant by the CoS. We asked the former them to reflect on mistakes and lessons learned and 
to write a memo for their successor. We asked them what advice and wisdom they would pass 
on. We distilled their reflections into lessons, using their words and phrases (see Rhodes and 
Tiernan 2014b). This approach can be summarized as the ‘3Rs’ of recover, recount and 
review. The aim is to recover the stories we are told by politicians and public servants. We 
systematised these accounts, telling our version of their stories, and recounted them. Our 
version was jointly reviewed to identify inaccuracies, divergence, and lessons. The aim was a 
fusion of horizons that covered both agreement and where we agreed to disagree. Both 
outcomes were reported. In effect, the ‘3Rs’ constitute a technology that can derive practical 
lessons from lived experience; an interpretive equivalent of evidence-based policymaking.  
The case against focus groups 
Focus groups also pose some specific problems. First, the qualitative data can be 
inaccurate and contested. For example, Nicole Feely recollected that Mike Keating (Head of 
PM&C) was not available to advise the new prime minister, John Howard, on the transition to 
government. Others contradicted her account. We resolved the issue by circulating all quotes 
from the transcripts to all participants. In effect, the participants checked one another’s version 
of events. We also did follow-up interviews with senior politicians and public servants who 
worked with the CoS. However, our task was to collect their stories, and even when there are 
competing stories, the lesson is obvious; ensure the Head of PM&C is available to advise the 
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prime minister during the transition. Moreover, focus groups were but one of our set of 
methods. We compared the version of events from different data sources. Ultimately, of 
course, the researcher’s judgement will prevail. It will be our version of their story, and we will 
choose between the competing versions by deciding which is most plausible because it marshals 
the more convincing evidence.  
Second, the data can be hard to analyse. Analysis hinges on the research question and 
the organising concepts of the researcher. In our case, we used an interpretive approach rooted 
in the work of Bevir and Rhodes (2003 and 2006). For example, we interpret the practices of 
CoS by ascribing beliefs to them. Practices presume apt beliefs, and beliefs do not make sense 
without the practices to which they refer. The beliefs of the CoS are about orderly process, not 
substantive political ideas and specific policies. The core belief is supporting and protecting the 
prime minister. The prime minister’s every wish is their command, even if the CoS pushes 
back on occasion. Of course, the prime minister’s wish might be for policy advice or acting as 
the keeper of the government’s narrative. Such work is done at the Prime Minister’s bidding, 
not on their own initiative. Indeed, the Prime Minister comes before party, government and the 
national interest. 
Third, there are practical problems. Recruiting a sample of respondents willing to 
participate in discussions in a group setting is an obvious one. Managing focus group 
interactions is another. Risks include a zealous moderator stifling the flow of group discussions 
or for conversation to be dominated by a few participants. The moderator of discussions 
among governing elites must be prepared to negotiate its personal dynamics. Detailed 
knowledge of political context, events and personalities is needed if the researcher is to 
understand and interpret discussions and exchanges between participants. The moderator must 
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have patience and tolerate the at times messy exchanges. Focus groups can be ‘untidy’. In 
seeking some order in the discussion, don’t expect and don’t want to be liked.  
Fourth, we agree that questions remain about the efficacy of focus groups if they are 
used as a stand-alone method in the social sciences (Bloor et al 2001; Morgan 1997). We did 
not use it as a stand-alone method. We used several methods so we could cross-check our data 
(see Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a). Using multiple sources of data gives many opportunities to 
cross-check the data and form a judgement about its reliability. 
Finally, researchers need to recognise that elite actors are both accustomed to and 
skilled in providing ‘strategic’ responses and directing discussion in preferred directions. 
Simply, ‘the research participants are more powerful than the researchers’ (Shore and Nugent 
2002: 11). They control access and exit. They end interviews, refuse permission to quote 
interviews, and deny us documents. They can control what we see and hear. These comments 
have much force when they refer to elite interviewing or observation (Rhodes 2011, Rhodes et 
al. 2007). However, the simple fact that a focus group is a ‘group’ means those individual 
strategic responses are subject to group scrutiny. To be effective, such responses need group 
agreement. Moreover, we note the possibility of strategic responses. We do not suggest they are 
the norm or even common, only that they occur. In this case, the group discussion was not 
arbitrarily ended. We published two books. We have permission to name our sources.  
Conclusion 
This paper is about one method, not about our theoretical approach or the substantive 
findings of our fieldwork. We have described how we have tweaked the focus group 
methodology for working with elite groups. We draw three conclusions. First, focus groups are 
a useful tool for recovering the beliefs and practices of governing elites but, second, they are not 
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a stand-alone tool. They are part of a larger toolkit that encompasses in-depth interviewing, 
official documents, biographies, memoirs and diaries, informal conversations, as well as the 
queen of ethnographic methods, observation. Finally, the analysis must be located in a broader 
framework. We do not claim that our interpretive approach is the only way to analyse focus 
group data. We do insist that any attempt to analyse that data must have an equally explicit 
theory. 
The CoS tell a tale of contingency; of helping the prime minister –the office and the 
person - to cope and survive the myriad pressures and inherent dependencies of political 
leadership. We know the CoS speak a shared, sometimes puzzling, language. Their words tell a 
tale of contingency and personalities:  
it was extraordinarily chaotic. You know, you have this impression that it’s 
all ordered and disciplined and it all happens in this way, all the right people are 
consulted et cetera. Often it’s not like that at all. Often it depends—and this is no 
surprise—it depends so much on personal relationships. When they’re in good 
stead and good standing, things happen in a different way as compared to when 
they’re fractured (Allan Hawke when CoS to Paul Keating) 
It is a closed world. Still, they gave us the opportunity to record their beliefs and practices. 
They talked to us about many matters that simply do not get into academic books, journals or 
the media. Maybe we asked leading questions. Perhaps it was just the way conversation flowed. 
Nonetheless, we are confident the focus groups provided a context in which much tacit 
knowledge was made explicit.  
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Notes 
1 We must note two partial exceptions. First, the Public Administration Theory Network 
(PAT-Net) has an annual conference and its own journal, Administrative Theory & Practice. 
It is associated with postmodernism and critical theory. Second, the Interpretive Policy 
Analysis network also has its own annual international conference and associated journal, 
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Critical Policy Studies. Both draw on ethnography. Both are examples of ‘patterned 
isolationism’; that is marginalised areas of inquiry which do not ‘fit’ the disciplinary 
mainstream. At best, these alternative theories and methods sit alongside, and at worst outside, 
established disciplines and departments (Collini 2001: 299). 
2 For example, Arthur Sinodinos had left the CoS position in December 2006. He was 
working in finance and banking and was serving on the ANZSOG Board. He became a 
Senator for New South Wales in September 2011, filling a casual vacancy. Similarly, Don 
Russell (CoS to Paul Keating) was working in the financial services sector in Sydney when 
approached to participate in our study. He was appointed Secretary of the Department of 
Innovation, Industry, Science and Research in 2010. It is unlikely either would have agreed to 
participate had they held public positions at the time.  
3Australian government has a House of Representatives and a Senate. The latter can block 
legislation initiated by the House. When he was Prime Minister, John Howard did not control 
the Senate until his final term. During his first term, he relied on support from the Australian 
Democrats and independents, including Independent Senator for Tasmania, Brian Harradine 
(see Howard 2010: 241–3). 
4 For lack of space we cannot discuss institutional memory here but for more detail see 
Rhodes 2011 and Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a. See also Pollitt 2008. 
